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ELLIOTT V. WILLIS-

LOSS OF CONSORTIUM RECOVERABLE
IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 1 a decedent's family is compensated for damages sustained due to his or her death.2 Traditionally, the

damages for wrongful death have been measured by various losses 3 sustained

by survivors. 4 A controversy arises, however, in determining the proper
statutory scope of the term "pecuniary injuries." 5 Recently, in Elliott v.
Willis,6 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District addressed the
issue of whether loss of consortium is recoverable in wrongful death actions.
Favoring a liberal definition of pecuniary loss, the fourth district held that a
trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction regarding the loss of consortium
in a wrongful death action was reversible error. 7 Justice Trapp voiced a
strong dissent. 8
In Elliott, the decedent Paul Elliott was killed when his car collided with a
pick-up truck driven by Hilda Willis. 9 Elliott's estate prevailed in a wrongful death action against Willis but was denied a proffered jury instruction on
loss of consortium.' 0 Contending that the jury award was insufficient as a
matter of law and that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on loss of

1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1979).
2. The Wrongful Death Act provides that an action may be brought against the tortfeasor
whenever the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act of another under circumstances
that would have permitted the injured to recover if death had not ensued. The action must be
brought by the personal representative of the deceased, for the benefit of the widow and next of
kin. Id.
3. The basis for recovery is the pecuniary value of decedent's life measured by his or her
personal characteristics, prospects, habits, and earnings. See Zostautas v. St. Anthony DePadua
Hosp., 23111. 2d 326, 178 N.E.2d 303 (1961); Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 I11.
571, 162 N.E. 170 (1928).
Pecuniary damages, however, have not been limited to the present loss of money. See Graul v.
Adrian, 32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965) (loss of instruction or training to a minor); Hall v.
Cillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) (loss of services); Slone v. Morton, 39 Ill. App. 2d
495, 188 N.E.2d 493 (1st Dist. 1963) (loss of support); Chapman v. Gulf Mobile & O.R.R., 337
Ill. App. 611, 86 N.E.2d 552 (3d Dist. 1949) (nominal damages).
4. The persons entitled to recover under the Act are the surviving spouse and next of kin.
Nudd v. Matsovkas, 7111. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527,,
151 N.E.2d 120 (4th Dist. 1958).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1979). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
RFmEDtEs § 8.4, at 558 (1973).
6. 89 I11.
App. 3d 1144, 412 N.E.2d 638 (4th Dist. 1980).
7. Id. at 1147, 412 N.E.2d at 641.
8. Id. at 1151, 412 N.E.2d at 643 (Trapp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
notes 40-48 and accompanying text infra.
9. 89 I11.
App. 3d at 1145, 412 N.E.2d at 639. Hilda had driven her daughter's mail route
that day, and the daughter was therefore joined as a principal and co-defendant. Id.
10. Id.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:543

consortium was reversible error, the decedent's estate appealed." The primary issue raised on appeal was whether the lower court erred by failing to
give the tendered jury instruction.12
The fourth district court began its analysis by examining three Illinois
Supreme Court decisions dealing with loss of consortium. In two of these
cases, Hall v. Gillins"3 and Knierim v. Izzo,1 4 widows had initiated common
law tort actions for "destruction of the family unit,"' rather than statutory
wrongful death actions. In both decisions the supreme court reasoned that
because the statutory remedy preempted the common law and was not
significantly different from the common law tort, it could not permit a tort
action.' The Elliott court treated this analysis as indicating that the statutory action contemplated recovery analogous to tort damages, which include
loss of consortium.' 7 Further, according to the court, neither Hall nor
Knierim had specifically excluded any type of recovery in wrongful death
actions.' 8 Thus, the Elliott court concluded that neither case precluded
damages for loss of consortium in wrongful death cases.' 9 The court also
considered Dini v. Naiditch,20 a case in which the supreme court had permitted a wife to recover for loss of consortium when her husband was injured. 21
If recovery is allowed when a spouse is injured, the Elliott court reasoned,
logic dictates that recovery be available when an injury proves fatal.2 2
11. Id. There were actually two counts to the appeal. The estate also argued that the jury
should have been instructed to include as damages the loss to the estate caused by the payment of
death taxes. This issue was not related in any germane sense to the loss of consortium issue. The
appellate court held that the denial of such instruction by the trial court was proper, and the
dissenting justice agreed. Id. at 1149, 412 N.E.2d at 642.
12. Id. at 1145, 412 N.E.2d at 639. The current Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions exclude
consortium as an element of loss. ILL. PArrERN JuRY INsTRuCrIONS (CIVIL) § 31.07 (2d ed. 1971)
(IPI).
13. 13 I11.
2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958).
14. 22 I11.
2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
15. The difference between the common law cause of action for destruction of the family
unit and the statutory wrongful death action relates to the parties who can bring the action and
the elements of damage that may be considered in determining the amount compensable. Hall v.
Gillins, 13 I11.
2d 26, 29, 147 N.E.2d 352, 353 (1958).
16. In Hall v. Gillins, 13 I11.
2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958), the plaintiff had alleged loss of
support, companionship, guidance, advice, and love and affection. Although the court found the
statutory term "pecuniary injuries" sufficiently broad to encompass most of these losses, it did
not indicate which losses were excluded. Id. at 31, 147 N.E.2d at 355. A similar conclusion was
reached in Knierim v. Izzo, 22 II1.
2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961). The Knierim court held that
the differences between an action for loss of consortium and an action for pecuniary loss under
the statute did not justify treating loss of consortium as an additional remedy. Id. at 82-83, 174
N.E.2d at 162-63.
17. 89 I11.
App. 3d at 1147, 42 N.E.2d at 640.
18. Id. at 1146-47, 42 N.E.2d at 639-40.
19. Id. at 1147, 42 N.E.2d at 640.
20. 20 I11.
2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
21. Id. at 430, 170 N.E.2d at 893. In Dini, the plaintiff sought recovery for loss of consortium for the period after her spouse's injury but before his death. Id.
22. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1146, 42 N.E.2d at 639. Other jurisdictions have taken this position.
See, e.g., Pesce v. Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 86, 90, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451, 454-55 (1975).
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Having decided that Illinois precedent implies loss of consortium damages
in a wrongful death action, the Elliott court proceeded to examine the
23
method established by the Wrongful Death Act for measuring damages.
The defendant argued that the statute only granted damages to compensate
the survivors for their financial dependency on the deceased family member;
thus, consortium was beyond the statutory scope as its loss affects only the
surviving spouse. 24 The majority responded that by limiting recovery to
only those losses affecting all survivors, much compensation now awarded in
wrongful death cases would fall by the wayside. 25 Juries would have to be
instructed, for example, to disregard a child's loss of guidance due to one
parent's death because the surviving spouse would not suffer the same loss, 26
and to disallow recovery by parents for death of their minor child unless they
could show dependency on the child for support. 27 Significantly, the court
stressed that pecuniary damages have not been limited to the present loss of a
minor's financial contributions to the family unit,2 8 but have been predi29
cated, at least in part, on intangible considerations such as a child's health,
30
31
mental ability, and life expectancy.
The statute was intended, in the
32
majority's view, to provide broad based relief, including loss of consortium.
33
Despite a contrary decision by the first district only two years before, the
Elliott court maintained that because evidence of the companionable nature
of the decedent's relationship with his widow was properly admitted, the
decedent's estate was entitled to an instruction on loss of consortium . 34 In
Kaiserman v. Bright,35 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
refused to allow recovery for loss of consortium in wrongful death actions.3 6
Acknowledging the first district's decision in Kaiserman, the Elliott court
7
stated that it was not bound by the decision and declined to follow it.3

23. The statute provides: "[T]he jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and
just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the
surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased spouse." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1979).
24. 89 I11.App. 3d at 1148, 412 N.E.2d at 641.
25. Id.
26. Id. See Graul V. Adrian, 32 Ill. 2d 345, 205 N.E.2d 444 (1965).
27. 89 I11. App. 3d at 1148, 412 N.E.2d at 641. See Prendergast v. Chicago Ry., 114 Ill.
App. 156 (1905).
28. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1148, 412 N.E.2d at 641.
29. See Flynn v. Vancil, 41 111. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968).
30. See Long y. Bennet, 55 Il. App. 3d 50, 370 N.E.2d 627 (4th Dist. 1977).
31. See Baird v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 63 Ill. 2d 463, 349 N.E.2d 413 (1976).
32. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1148, 412 N.E.2d at 640-41.
33. See Kaiserman v. Bright, 61 111. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1978).
34. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1147, 412 N.E.2d at 640.
35. 61 Ill. App. 3d 67, 377 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1978).
36. Id. at 70, 377 N.E.2d at 264.
37. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1148, 412 N.E.2d at 642. The obvious conflict between the Elliot and
Kaiserman cases once again illustrates the continuing problem of the stare decisis effect of Illinois
Appellate Court decisions. One commentator suggests that if each of the five Appellate Districts
in Illinois would recognize that the decisions of the coordinate branches of the court cast a stare
decisis net upon them individually, the Illinois Appellate system would become more uniform
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Justice Trapp, in a partial dissent, 38 maintained that if the supreme court
had determined that intangibles such as loss of society were within the

statute's scope, it would have so held in Hall, Knierim, or Dini.39 Because it
did not, and because the language of the Wrongful Death Act has remained
unchanged since its adoption in 1853 despite restrictive supreme court interpretations, Judge Trapp concluded that the legislature must be satisfied with
the Act's present construction. 40 In addition, he argued that just as the
supreme court had previously refused to read loss of consortium into the
Illinois Dramshop Act 4' the Elliott court should not have " 'under the guise
of statutory construction, enlarge[d] the classifications of actionable injuries
under the Act.' "42 Moreover, Justice Trapp contended that the majority's
conclusion after examining Dini-that loss of consortium should not be
denied merely because an injury results in death-was erroneous because to
43

allow recovery for loss of consortium would be to allow double recovery.

Finally, the dissenting judge disputed the majority's contention that intangible factors have always been a part of wrongful death damages determinations. Citing the same Illinois precedent the majority used, 44 he asserted that

non-financial considerations are only allowed into evidence to show the
scope of the actual pecuniary loss sustained, not to establish an additional
45
element of damages.
Historically, Illinois courts have strictly construed the wrongful death
statute. 4 Losses recoverable under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act have
been limited to those "susceptible of pecuniary valuation. "4' The rationale
underlying this limitation was to prevent damage awards based upon conjecand stable and the conflict among the separate Districts could be lessened or avoided. Mattis &
Yalowitz, Stare Decisis Among [Sic] the Appellate Court of Illinois, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 571
(1979).
38. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1151, 412 N.E.2d at 643 (Trapp, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1152, 412 N.E.2d at 644.
41. In Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961), the court specifically held that
"mental anguish, disgrace, and loss of society do not constitute an injury to persons within the
meaning of the [Dram Shop Act]." Id. at 80, 174 N.E.2d at 161.
42. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1152, 412 N.E.2d at 644 (quoting Knierim v. Izzo, 22 I11. 2d 73, 80,
174 N.E.2d 157, 161 (1961)).
43. Id. But see Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). In Dini, the court
stated that the "double recovery" argument is merely a convenient cliche for denying the wife's
action for loss of consortium. The contention, the court maintained, emphasizes only one
element of recovery, the loss of support. Id. at 427, 170 N.E.2d at 891.
44. 89 Ill. App. 3d at 1152-53, 412 N.E.2d at 645. See notes 13, 14 & 20 and accompanying
text supra.
45. 89 111.App. 3d at 1153, 412 N.E.2d at 645.
46. See, e.g., Schlavick v. Manhattan Brewing Co., 103 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Ill. 1952);
Comment, Wrongful Death Recovery Limitations-R.I.P., 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 385, 392 (1968)
(courts have held that the statute's benefits "should not be extended to causes not fairly within its
language nor fairly inferable therefrom").
47. Howlett v. Doglio, 402 I11. 311, 317, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1949). Accord, Flynn v.
Vancil, 41 111. 2d 236, 242 N.E.2d 237 (1968).

1981]

ELLIOT V. WILLIS

547

ture. 4s The contention has been that intangible elements such as sentiment
and affection are difficult to evaluate and capable only of speculation. 49 In
Elliott, however, the fourth district court broadly construed the statutory
definition of pecuniary injury to include loss of consortium. Unpersuaded by
the traditional view, the court indicated that the scope of pecuniary loss as
determined by Illinois courts encompasses some intangible considerations. 5
The Elliott decision signifies a refusal to adopt an arbitrary rule allowing
recovery for some intangible losses but not for others.

48. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 907 (4th ed. 1971).

49. See Howlett v. Doglio, 402 Ill. 311, 317, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1949) (loss of society and
companionship of deceased incapable of pecuniary valuation).
50. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.

